

## **Abstract**

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions—an agent’s prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent’s prior behavior—as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent’s subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent’s prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent’s subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

## Introduction

Consider making the following prediction: “My father is going to pick me up from the airport when I fly home to visit tomorrow.” Given this prediction, you may be extremely surprised if he forgets to pick you up. Conversely, if your prediction was that he would forget to pick you up (perhaps because you just phoned him and he did not mention your travel plans), you may be especially surprised when he shows up at the airport right on time. In either case, you would experience social prediction error (i.e., a difference between what was expected and what was observed, within a social context).

There is a variety of information on which people base their predictions of others. This information can include but is not limited to: an agent’s prior behavioral history (Dungan, Stepanovic, & Young, 2016; Heil et al., 2019), their prior mental states (Dungan et al., 2016), and descriptive or prescriptive norms (see Theriault, Young, & Feldman Barrett, 2021). These sources can be used to predict not only an agent’s future behavior, but also their future mental states. For example, you might predict that your father will pick you up (or simply wants to pick you up) from the airport based on: his calling you to talk about your travel plans, explicit knowledge of his desire to pick you up (perhaps because your mother told you this), or the idea that parents tend to pick up their children from the airport. The current paper zeroes in on prior behavior and prior mental states as sources of social prediction, investigating whether the type of information on which people base their predictions, as well as the type of information that is being predicted, affects how surprising an outcome is. Specifically, we examine the brain regions implicated in processing agents’ unexpected behavior and mental states as a function of their prior behavior and mental states.

Research on social prediction error has been steadily increasing, due to a seminal review article linking predictive coding models to theory of mind (ToM) tasks in neuroscience (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Predictive coding, put simply, is the idea that neuronal activity contains not only information about sensory input, but also information about the difference between expected and actual sensory input (e.g., Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Wacongne, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2012). The crucial idea behind the marriage of predictive coding and ToM is that “most experiments on ToM depend on predictions based on prior expectations and an internal model of human behavior” (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). As in the opening example, you may make predictions about your father’s mental states (or behavior) based on his prior mental states (or behavior). In line with Koster-Hale & Saxe’s (2013) theorizing, if your predictions are not borne out, your experience of prediction error may be due to ToM regions (i.e., DMPFC, PC, LTPJ, and RTPJ) preferentially responding to information that is inconsistent with your predictions.

Extant research supports this notion, showing that predictions about a person’s mental states or behaviors are influenced by social knowledge. For example, Saxe and Wexler (2005) presented participants with stories about social agents whose mental states were consistent or inconsistent with expectations that follow from social norms within the target agent’s culture (e.g., your friend from high school, who has a happy marriage, confides in you that he [really hates the idea that/ would find it fun if] his wife might ever have an affair). For participants, and for their imagined target friend, the cultural norm was that happily married people do not find it exciting if their partner wants a relationship with another person. RTPJ activity was stronger when the target’s cultural norms were violated, and this result held even when participants’ own cultural norms differed from the target’s. Similarly, bilateral TPJ and MPFC were recruited more

when participants learned about politicians whose political desires were incongruent (versus congruent) with their party identity (e.g., a democrat who wants a [smaller/larger] government), suggesting that these regions preferentially respond to expectation-violating information (Cloutier et al., 2011). Even knowledge of an agent's ability (e.g., a novice versus an experienced bowler) is enough to produce prediction error in mentalizing regions when performance is inconsistent with that ability (Heil et al., 2019).

In total, it seems that ToM regions flexibly encode different information types to make predictions and process expectation violations. This flexibility account finds additional support in recent work on metaethical judgments. Theriault et al. (2020) demonstrated that moral statements judged as more preference-like elicit greater ToM activity, whereas moral statements judged as more fact-like elicit less ToM activity. In each case, ToM activity was related not to an agent, but to social consensus regarding metaethics. However, even though past research is generally consistent with an account in which ToM regions flexibly encodes and uses the available types of social information to make predictions and process their outcomes, individual studies have tended to focus on only a single type of information when engendering predictions or revealing outcomes.

More targeted research has attempted to isolate expectation-based ToM effects that result from various social knowledge sources. Dungan et al. (2016) presented participants with stories that varied the source of an expectation (i.e., an agent's prior mental state vs behavior), and whether subsequent behavior was consistent with that expectation. Results showed that DMPFC and bilateral TPJ were preferentially recruited for unexpected over expected behaviors. However, simple effects analyses revealed that the effect in bilateral TPJ was evident only when prior information was behavior.

## **Current Research**

Because Dungan et al. (2016) varied only the prior information type (i.e., behavior versus mental state) and not the outcome information (i.e., all outcomes were behaviors), it was impossible to know whether ToM regions would also preferentially respond to unexpected mental state outcomes. Similarly, participants might have experienced especially strong prediction error if they had instead learned about a mental state that was inconsistent with a prior mental state. Additionally, because Dungan et al.'s expectedness effect in bilateral TPJ occurred only when prior information was about behavior, it was impossible to know whether the lack of an effect in the other prior information condition (i.e., mental state) was simply due to a mismatch between prior and outcome types. For example, if your father did not show up at the airport to pick you up, and your prior information was that he simply *wanted* to pick you up, you may have considered the fact that even though people sometimes want to do something, they often do not (or cannot) do it. Therefore, you may not find your father's behavior particularly surprising. For these reasons, the current paper uses a novel paradigm to examine whether social prediction error occurs across brain regions typically implicated in thinking about others' minds, as well as whether these regions' sensitivity to social prediction error differs as a function of the type of information that is used to make predictions and the type of information that confirms or violates them.

## **fMRI Experiment**

### **Method**

#### *Participants*

Participants were 25 right-handed adults were recruited from the Greater Boston Area. One participant, unable to remain still, was removed from the scanner partway through the study,

resulting in a final  $N = 24$  (age:  $M=24.08$ ,  $SD=4.11$ ; 50% female). All participants were native English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave written informed consent in accordance with the Boston College Internal Review Board. Additionally, participants reported no psychiatric disorders or history of learning disabilities. Sample size was determined by available resources at the time data were collected; we note that although this sample size is small, it is typical of the time these data were collected in 2015.


### *Procedure and Materials*

Participants were scanned while reading and responding to 64 vignettes, learning and making predictions about 64 different agents (see Supplemental Online Materials [SOM]). Each story was presented in three sequential segments: Initial Info, Prediction, and Final Info (see Figure 1). During the Initial Info segment, participants read background information to establish an expectation about how an agent would likely think or behave in the future. During the Prediction segment, participants were presented with a multiple-choice question asking them to make a prediction about the agent's future thoughts or behavior. Four options were provided: one that was expected based on the Initial Info segment, and three others that would be relatively unexpected. Participants responded to this question by using a button-box. During the Final Info segment, the vignette's outcome was presented, which corresponded to one option from the Prediction segment's multiple-choice question.

Critically, we varied the type of information presented in each segment. The Initial Info segment consisted of either the agent's 1) prior behavior, or 2) prior mental states. Similarly, during the Prediction segment, participants made a prediction about either the agent's 1) subsequent behavior, or 2) subsequent mental state. Last, the Final Info segment presented participants with either the agent's 1) actual subsequent behavior, or 2) actual subsequent mental

state, which was the same type of information queried in the Prediction segment. Also, the Final Info segment presented was either expected or unexpected based on the information provided in the Initial Info segment. For the Final Info segment, an unexpected ending was shown on half of all trials, whereas an expected ending was shown on the remaining trials. Crossing these dimensions (Initial Info, Final Info, and Expectedness) yielded 8 conditions in a 2 (Initial Info: behavior, mental state) x 2 (Final Info: behavior, mental state) x 2 (Expectedness: expected, unexpected) design. These three experimental factors were also manipulated within stimuli, constituting a fully within-subject/within-stimulus design. The order of conditions and pairing of conditions and vignettes were randomized across participants. An online behavioral sample, that completed the same task as the fMRI participants did, verified that we successfully manipulated expectedness (see SOM).

The vignettes were presented in a pseudo-randomized order in white font on a black background via an Apple Macbook Pro running MATLAB 8.5 (2015) with Psychophysics Toolbox. The Initial Info segment was presented on-screen for 10 seconds, the Prediction segment for 8 seconds, and the Final Info segment for 4 seconds. To analyze Initial Info and Final Info segments separately, 0, 2, or 4 seconds of jittered fixation were included between each story segment. Stimulus presentation was divided into 8 equal runs (8 stimuli per run, 1 per condition) lasting 4 minutes and 4 seconds each.



**Figure 1.** Example experimental stimulus and its variants. Participants first read the initial information segment of the stimulus (Behavior or Mental), then made a prediction (Behavior or Mental), and last learned the final information. Importantly, final information type (Behavior or Mental) always matched prediction type. Participants never saw the same stimulus across conditions; different participants saw different experimental variations of the same stimulus.

### *Functional Localizer*

Participants also completed a theory of mind (ToM) functional localizer task (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011) consisting of 10 stories about mental states (e.g., false-belief condition) and 10 stories about physical representations (e.g., false-photograph condition). The task was presented in two 4.5-minute runs, interleaved between experiment runs.

### *fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing*

The fMRI data were collected using a 16-channel head coil in a 3T Siemens scanner at the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Data were acquired in 36 near-axial slices (3mm isotropic voxels, 0.54mm gap). Standard gradient echo

planar imaging (EPI) procedures were used (TR=2000ms; TE=30ms; flip angle=90°; FOV=216 x 216; interleaved acquisition). Anatomical data were collected with T1-weighted multi-echo magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo image sequences (MEMPRAGE) using the following parameters: TR=2530ms; TE=1.64ms; FA=7°; 1mm isotropic voxels; 0.5mm gap between slices; FOV=256 x 256. Data processing and analysis were performed using fMRIPrep (Esteban et al. (2019); see Supplementary Materials p. 1 for details), SPM12 (<https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/>), and custom software. The functional data were realigned, coregistered to the anatomical image, normalized onto a common brain space (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI, template), spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (fullwidth half-maximum = 8 mm kernel), and high-pass filtered (128 Hz). Neural responses were modeled in an event-related design using a general linear model (GLM), with conditions modeled as boxcar functions convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The GLM included the six components of the anatomical CompCor variant (aCompCor) as nuisance regressors (Behzadi, Restom, Liau, Liu, 2007).

### *Analytic Approach*

Whole-brain and regions of interest (ROI) analyses were conducted. For brevity, we describe only the ROI analyses here (see SOM for whole-brain results). A whole-brain contrast of false-belief versus false-photograph stories in the ToM localizer task (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011) was used to identify ROIs implicated in ToM: DMPFC ( $N = 20$ ), PC ( $N = 23$ ), LTPJ ( $N = 22$ ), and RTPJ ( $N = 23$ ). ROIs were selected for each participant individually and defined as contiguous voxels within a 9-mm radius of the peak voxel that passed contrast threshold. Within each ROI, the average percent signal change (PSC) relative to runwise baseline ( $PSC = 100 \times \text{raw BOLD magnitude for (condition - fixation)} / \text{raw BOLD magnitude for fixation}$ ) was calculated for

each condition at each time point (averaging across all voxels in the ROI and all blocks of the same condition). Initial Info and Final Info segments were modeled separately. Timepoints were shifted by 6 seconds to account for hemodynamic lag. The Prediction segment was not analyzed.

Importantly, for all ROI analyses, we analyzed only trials on which participants selected the correct outcome prediction. This was done to ensure that our results were uncontaminated by the possibility of participants' lack of attention, random responding, or their own expectations being different from the paradigm's intended expectations. The frequency of incorrect predictions was similar across Initial Info x Final Info conditions (i.e., BB, BM, MB, MM): 16%, 12%, 15%, and 13% of each condition's total trials were incorrect, respectively. Further, we removed images according to the following criteria: individual scans, along with their two temporally adjacent scans, were excluded if framewise displacement (FD) (Power et al., 2012) exceeded 0.5mm; individual runs were excluded if either (1) FD for more than two-thirds of the scans in that run exceeded 0.5mm or (2) FD for any scan in that run exceeded 3mm (see results' table notes for final analyzable Ns).

For all ROI analyses, linear mixed effects models were constructed in R (R Core Team, 2021) to simultaneously account for variability across participants and stimuli (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). Within each ROI, we attempted to fit a maximal model that allowed all main effects and interactions to vary over participants and stimuli. If the maximal model failed to converge or yielded a singular fit, we followed guidelines to avoid false positives (see Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013; Singmann & Kellen, 2019). First, we simplified the random effects structure by removing all correlations between random effects. Next, if the zero-correlation model failed to converge or converged with a singular fit, we further simplified the random effects structure by removing variance components that were estimated as zero. If this further

reduced model resulted in non-convergence, or convergence with a singular fit, we repeated the second step. If there were no remaining variances estimated as zero, we removed the smallest variance components, one at a time, until the model converged with a non-singular fit. Last, when appropriate, we attempted to add random effects' correlations back into the model (see Bates et al., 2018). If this extended model converged with a non-singular fit, we retained it as our final model. However, if this extended model did not converge, or converged with a singular fit, we retained the non-extended model as our final model. We report only our final models here. The entire model selection process (i.e., specifications and simplifications) can be found on our OSF page: [https://osf.io/tf852/?view\\_only=33b3592a9571463c8e927278a27f718a](https://osf.io/tf852/?view_only=33b3592a9571463c8e927278a27f718a).

## **Results**

### *Initial Info*

Here, we investigated the effect of the Initial Info manipulation on neural activity during the Initial Info segment. We note that model reduction within each ROI sometimes led to different random effects structures across ROIs. We chose this strategy of conservatism (rather than an anti-conservative strategy which held random effects structures constant across ROIs) in order to avoid false positives in some ROIs. Within each ToM ROI, there was no effect of the Initial Info manipulation on neural activity during the Initial Info segment. See Tables 1 – 4 for detailed information about all final models (i.e., coding scheme, random effects structure, random effects estimates, and fixed effects estimates). These patterns held when analyzing neural activity averaged across the entire ToM network (see Table 5).

**Table 1.** DMPFC activity during Initial Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>				
PSC ~ Initial + (1   Item) + (1   Subject)				
<b>Coding:</b>				
Initial Info: Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
<i>Item</i>				
	Intercept	.003	.052	
<i>Subject</i>				
	Intercept	.015	.124	
<b>Residual</b>				
		.116	.341	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>		<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	Intercept	-.03 (.03)	-1.01 (21)	.325
	Initial	.01 (.02)	0.53 (997)	.593

*Note.* Analysis included 1063/1280 observations from 20 subjects and 64 items. Degrees of freedom were Satterthwaite-approximated and rounded to the nearest integer for all analyses.

**Table 2.** PC activity during Initial Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>				
PSC ~ Initial + (1 + Initial    Item) + (1   Subject)				
<b>Coding:</b>				
Initial Info: Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
<i>Item</i>				
	Intercept	.002	.048	
	Initial	.001	.031	
<i>Subject</i>				
	Intercept	.006	.079	
<b>Residual</b>				
		.103	.322	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>		<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	Intercept	-.04 (.02)	-2.07 (24)	.049 *
	Initial	-.00 (.02)	-0.01 (60)	.992

*Note.* Analysis included 1234/1472 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 3.** LTPJ activity during Initial Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>					
PSC ~ Initial + (1 + Initial   Item) + (1   Subject)					
<b>Coding:</b>					
Initial Info: Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)					
<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Correlations</b>		
<i>Item</i>					
Intercept	.003	.051	-		
Initial	.005	.067	.23	-	
<i>Subject</i>					
Intercept	.049	.222	-		
<b>Residual</b>					
	.087	.294			
<b>Fixed Effects</b>			<b><i>b (SE)</i></b>	<b><i>t (df)</i></b>	<b><i>p-value</i></b>
Intercept			.12 (.05)	2.54 (22)	.019 *
Initial			-.01 (.02)	-0.67 (65)	.508

Note. Analysis included 1189/1408 observations from 22 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 4.** RTPJ activity during Initial Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>					
PSC ~ Initial + (1   Item) + (1   Subject)					
<b>Coding:</b>					
Initial Info: Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)					
<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>			
<i>Item</i>					
Intercept	.001	.036			
<i>Subject</i>					
Intercept	.012	.108			
<b>Residual</b>					
	.071	.267			
<b>Fixed Effects</b>			<b><i>b (SE)</i></b>	<b><i>t (df)</i></b>	<b><i>p-value</i></b>
Intercept			-.02 (.02)	-0.68 (23)	.504
Initial			.01 (.02)	0.61 (1161)	.539

Note. Analysis included 1234/1472 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 5.** ToM Network activity (averaged across ROIs) during Initial Info segment

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**Final Model:**  
PSC ~ Initial + (1 | Item) + (1 | Subject)

**Coding:**  
Initial Info: Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)

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<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>
<i>Item</i>		
Intercept	.002	.039
<i>Subject</i>		
Intercept	.009	.095
<b>Residual</b>		
	.047	.216

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<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b><i>b (SE)</i></b>	<b><i>t (df)</i></b>	<b><i>p-value</i></b>
Intercept	.01 (.02)	0.30 (24)	.768
Initial	.00 (.01)	0.13 (1158)	.897


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*Note.* Analysis included 1234 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

### *Final Info*

Here, we investigated the effect of the Initial Info, Final Info, and Expectedness manipulations on neural activity during the Final Info segment. See Figure 2 for results plotted by ROI and Tables 6 – 9 for detailed information about all final models. We note, here too, that model reduction within each ROI sometimes led to different random effects structures across ROIs. We chose this strategy of conservatism (rather than an anti-conservative strategy which held random effects structures constant across ROIs) in order to avoid false positives in some ROIs.

In DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ, there were main effects of Expectedness, such that neural activity was higher when the final information was unexpected compared to expected (DMPFC:  $b = .10$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $p = .004$ ; LTPJ:  $b = .06$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $p = .015$ ; RTPJ:  $b = .06$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $p = .004$ ). This main effect of Expectedness held when analyzing neural activity averaged across the entire ToM network (see Table 10). To investigate the robustness of these unexpectedness effects, we investigated how many participants showed them, finding that most participants showed these effects within each ROI (DMPFC = 16/20; LTPJ = 13/21; RTPJ = 17/23). Additionally, in DMPFC only, there was a main effect of Initial Info, such that neural activity during the Final Info segment was higher when Initial Info was behavior (compared to mental),  $b = .05$  ( $SE = .02$ ),  $p = .033$ . No other main effects or interactions were observed.



**Figure 2.** PSC during Final Info segment within each ROI. On the x-axis, the top factor (Behavior vs Mental) refers to the Initial Info manipulation, whereas the bottom factor (Behavior vs Mental) refers to the Final Info manipulation. Solid bars show expected outcome responses, whereas patterned bars show unexpected outcome responses. Estimates are predicted means from each ROI's linear mixed effects model. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE for the predicted mean.

**Table 6.** DMPFC activity during Final Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>			
PSC ~ Initial*Final*Expected +			
(1 + Final + Initial:Final + Initial:Expected + Final:Expected    Item) +			
(1 + Expected + Initial:Final:Expected    Subject)			
<b>Coding:</b>			
Initial Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Final Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Expectedness:	Contrast coded (Expected = -0.5; Unexpected = +0.5)		
<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>	
<i>Item</i>			
Intercept	.002	.045	
Final	.000	.094	
Initial:Final	.014	.119	
Initial:Expected	.008	.091	
Final:Expected	.013	.113	
<i>Subject</i>			
Intercept	.027	.163	
Expected	.007	.081	
Initial:Final:Expected	.004	.064	
<b>Residual</b>	.123	.350	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Intercept	-.02 (.04)	-0.45 (20)	.659
Initial	.05 (.02)	2.13 (869)	.033 *
Final	-.03 (.03)	-1.36 (60)	.178
Expected	.10 (.03)	3.35 (17)	.004 **
Initial:Final	-.00 (.05)	-0.04 (63)	.965
Initial:Expected	-.05 (.05)	-1.06 (60)	.294
Final:Expected	.01 (.05)	0.12 (62)	.903
Initial:Final:Expected	-.04 (.09)	-0.46 (14)	.653

*Note.* Analysis included 1021/1280 observations from 20 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 7.** PC activity during Final Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>			
PSC ~ Initial*Final*Expected +			
(1 + Expected + Initial:Final + Initial:Expected + Initial:Final:Expected    Item) +			
(1 + Initial:Expected    Subject)			
<b>Coding:</b>			
Initial Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Final Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Expectedness:	Contrast coded (Expected = -0.5; Unexpected = +0.5)		
<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>	
<i>Item</i>			
Intercept	.002	.044	
Expected	.000	.001	
Initial:Final	.016	.128	
Initial:Expected	.005	.069	
Initial:Final:Expected	.043	.209	
<i>Subject</i>			
Intercept	.010	.100	
Initial:Expected	.002	.046	
<b>Residual</b>			
	.104	.323	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>b (SE)</b>	<b>t (df)</b>	<b>p-value</b>
Intercept	-.03 (.02)	-1.47 (24)	.156
Initial	.03 (.02)	1.51 (991)	.140
Final	-.00 (.02)	-0.21 (989)	.829
Expected	.03 (.02)	1.68 (63)	.100
Initial:Final	.00 (.04)	0.10 (61)	.924
Initial:Expected	-.06 (.04)	-1.55 (17)	.139
Final:Expected	-.05 (.04)	-1.30 (979)	.194
Initial:Final:Expected	-.07 (.08)	-0.91 (59)	.368

*Note.* Analysis included 1179/1472 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 8.** LTPJ activity during Final Info segment

<b>Random Effects</b>			<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>	
<i>Item</i>					
Intercept	.002	.040			
Initial	.002	.047			
Expected	.005	.069			
Initial:Final	.029	.169			
Initial:Expected	.013	.113			
Final:Expected	.022	.148			
Initial:Final:Expected	.052	.228			
<i>Subject</i>					
Intercept	.037	.192			
Expected	.001	.027			
<b>Residual</b>			.093	.306	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b><i>b (SE)</i></b>		<b><i>t (df)</i></b>		<b><i>p-value</i></b>
Intercept	.09 (.04)		2.10	(21)	.048 *
Initial	-.01 (.02)		-0.48	(58)	.631
Final	-.03 (.02)		-1.54	(894)	.125
Expected	.06 (.02)		2.72	(17)	.015 *
Initial:Final	-.05 (.04)		-1.08	(61)	.284
Initial:Expected	-.02 (.04)		-0.62	(61)	.550
Final:Expected	.01 (.04)		0.35	(59)	.726
Initial:Final:Expected	.05 (.08)		0.60	(60)	.553

*Note.* Analysis included 1134/1408 observations from 22 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 9.** RTPJ activity during Final Info segment

<b>Final Model:</b>			
PSC ~ Initial*Final*Expected +			
(1 + Initial:Final + Initial:Final:Expected    Item) +			
(1 + Expected + Initial:Expected + Final:Expected + Initial:Final:Expected    Subject)			
<b>Coding:</b>			
Initial Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Final Info:	Contrast coded (Mental = -0.5; Behavior = +0.5)		
Expectedness:	Contrast coded (Expected = -0.5; Unexpected = +0.5)		
<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>	
<i>Item</i>			
Intercept	.001	.024	
Initial:Final	.008	.087	
Initial:Final:Expected	.002	.069	
<i>Subject</i>			
Intercept	.014	.117	
Expected	.000	.015	
Initial:Expected	.005	.068	
Final:Expected	.001	.030	
Initial:Final:Expected	.026	.162	
<b>Residual</b>			
	.083	.229	
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Intercept	.02 (.03)	0.60 (22)	.552
Initial	-.00 (.02)	-0.21 (986)	.828
Final	.00 (.02)	0.21 (988)	.836
Expected	.06 (.02)	3.24 (21)	.004 **
Initial:Final	.05 (.04)	1.31 (60)	.195
Initial:Expected	-.02 (.04)	-0.55 (18)	.590
Final:Expected	-.01 (.03)	-0.24 (22)	.813
Initial:Final:Expected	.04 (.08)	0.52 (17)	.611

*Note.* Analysis included 1179/1472 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

**Table 10.** ToM Network activity (averaged across ROIs) during Final Info segment

<b>Random Effects</b>		<b>Var.</b>	<b>SD</b>			
<i>Item</i>						
Intercept		.001	.035			
Final		.001	.032			
Expected		.000	.016			
Initial:Final		.007	.083			
Final:Expected		.007	.082			
Initial:Final:Expected		.021	.146			
<i>Subject</i>						
Intercept		.012	.109			
<b>Residual</b>						
		.052	.227			
<b>Fixed Effects</b>		<i>b (SE)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p-value</i>		
Intercept		.01 (.02)	0.40 (23)	.696		
Initial		.01 (.01)	1.07 (953)	.284		
Final		-.01 (.01)	-1.06 (61)	.294		
Expected		.06 (.01)	4.36 (61)	< .001 ***		
Initial:Final		.00 (.03)	0.08 (61)	.938		
Initial:Expected		-.03 (.03)	-1.25 (949)	.212		
Final:Expected		-.01 (.03)	-0.41 (61)	.684		
Initial:Final:Expected		-.00 (.06)	-0.02 (64)	.985		

*Note.* Analysis included 1179 observations from 23 subjects and 64 items.

## General Discussion

The current work investigated whether social prediction error (i.e., the difference between what was expected and what was observed) occurs across brain regions typically implicated in thinking about others' minds, as well as whether these regions' sensitivity to social prediction error differs as a function of the type of information that is used to make predictions and confirm or violate them. When people learned about an agent's unexpected mental states or behavior, DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ activity was higher than when people learned about an agent's expected mental states or behaviors. But no region showed differential effects of expectedness based on the type of information that was used to make predictions or confirm/violate them (i.e., mental states versus behaviors), suggesting that these regions may flexibly incorporate any available social information to make predictions about and monitor or explain social inconsistencies. These findings add to a growing literature (e.g., Cloutier et al., 2011; Dungan et al., 2016; Heil et al., 2019; Theriault et al., 2020; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) supporting the link between predictive coding and ToM activity (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). However, some of our results are consistent with prior research, whereas others are not.

In the current experiment, effects of expectedness in DMPFC, LTPJ and RTPJ are consistent with prior work. Specifically, such effects have been found in investigations of unexpected behaviors (Dungan et al., 2016; Heil et al., 2019) and unexpected mental states (Cloutier et al., 2011). Additionally, that we did not find an effect of expectedness in PC is also consistent with prior research (Dungan et al., 2016). However, we caution readers that this lack of detection (as well as other null effects) could be interpreted in the following ways: (1) no effect occurs in PC, (2) a theoretically meaningful but small effect occurs in PC but could not be detected, or (3) any effect that occurs in PC is too small to be theoretically meaningful. Because

there will be disagreement about what is theoretically meaningful to all researchers, we do not take a firm position on this issue. We do note the following: in the current experiment, standardized effect sizes for expectedness in DMPFC ( $d = 0.21$ ), LTPJ ( $d = 0.11$ ), and RTPJ ( $d = 0.15$ ) ranged from more than 1.5x – 3x the standardized effect size for expectedness in PC ( $d = 0.07$ ). (All  $d$ 's were calculated using variance estimates, as described in Brysbaert & Stevens, 2018; Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 2014). These estimates, combined with Dungan et al.'s reported null effect, suggests that PC may diverge from other ToM regions in monitoring expectation violations.

Other findings in the current experiment are somewhat surprising considering prior research. In particular, expectedness effects in ToM regions were not moderated by the type of information that engendered or violated predictions. On one popular account of cultural learning, people attend to “credibility-enhancing” displays to determine their degree of confidence in someone else's beliefs (Henrich, 2009), being more confident in someone else's beliefs when a costly behavior reflects the purported belief. Applying this logic to the current data, one possibility is that prior behaviors could have served as stronger predictors of subsequent behaviors/mental states because behaviors are interpreted as better signals of one's current beliefs or intentions. For example, community organizers who had themselves installed solar panels were more effective in recruiting new residents to install solar panels than organizers who had not done so, as the former engaged in costly behavior which was inferred as an honest signal of their belief in the technology's benefit (Kraft-Todd et al., 2018).

This possibility is also consistent with research by Dungan et al. (2016) in which an expectedness effect in RTPJ was driven by one condition (see Figure 2 of Dungan et al.). In the outcome segment, Dungan et al. reported that RTPJ showed an expectedness effect only when

prior information was behavior (but not mental), suggesting that RTPJ may be recruited specifically when an agent's subsequent behavior is inconsistent with their prior behavior, perhaps in order to generate mental states that explain the behavioral inconsistency (see Decety & Lamm, 2007). In the current experiment, however, when outcome information was behavior (as was always true in Dungan et al., 2016), we did not replicate this finding. More specifically, both expectedness simple effects were identical in magnitude in our data (initial behavior  $d = 0.14$ ; initial mental  $d = 0.14$ ). Using all of our data, we also failed to detect a three-way interaction among prior information, outcome information, and expectedness, suggesting that Dungan et al.'s (2016) findings in RTPJ may not be due to mismatches between prior information and outcome information.

On the other hand, on the logic that people can never be certain about the inferred mental states of others, explicit mental states could have served as stronger predictors of subsequent behaviors/mental states. That participants might make the most reliable predictions about future mental states based on prior mental states is also consistent with recent theoretical work arguing that people can track the transitional probabilities between mental states (Tamir & Thornton, 2018). Even though people do not come with thought bubbles above their heads in the real world, participants in the current experiment were given explicit access to others' mental states in a thought-bubble-like way. Therefore, the current data's lack of prior-by-outcome information moderation on prediction error signals is surprising. However, it has also been argued that social outcomes are inherently much less predictable than non-social outcomes (FeldmanHall & Shenhav, 2019), which may explain why social information type does not moderate the effects here. Further experimentation, and much larger (and therefore higher-powered) fMRI paradigms are needed to better understand if, when, and how social prediction error interacts with the type

of social information that predictions and violations were based on, as the observed null interactions could simply be false negatives.

There are multiple methodological features that may explain inconsistencies between the current work and Dungan et al.'s findings specifically. First, a strength of the current work is that stimuli were constructed for both behavioral and mental conditions of the prior information segment (see Figure 2 for an example), whereas stimuli in Dungan et al. were nested in a particular prior information condition (i.e., completely different stimuli constituted behavior versus mental conditions). Therefore, Dungan et al.'s effects of initial behavior versus initial mental states may have been driven by stimulus differences rather than a true distinction between information types. Second, data in the current experiment were analyzed with linear mixed effects models as opposed to traditional repeated-measures ANOVAs. For multilevel data (e.g., responses nested within participants/stimuli), linear mixed effects models better control Type I error rates by retaining the true variability in the data and adjusting standard errors of test statistics to account for the possibility that some participants/stimuli will respond (to an experimental manipulation) differently than other participants/stimuli. Therefore, some of Dungan et al.'s effects may have been due to specific participants or stimuli behaving in ways that led to a group-level effect which was not representative of most participants or stimuli. These methodological changes can also explain another discrepancy between the present data and Dungan et al.'s. In the prior information segment, Dungan et al. detected an effect in which RTPJ activity was higher when initial information was behavior (versus mental), suggesting that RTPJ may play a special role in mental state *inference* based on witnessed behavior rather than processing mental states directly. However, in the current experiment, we found no evidence of this effect ( $d = 0.03$ ). Sample size issues notwithstanding, we believe that the methods of the

current experiment offer the best tests of the ideas under investigation thus far. Therefore, that we successfully replicated prior research's effects of expectedness lends especially strong evidence to the idea that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are ToM regions coding for discrepancies between social predictions and their outcomes.

### **Limitations and Future Directions**

Although the current experiment improved on prior work, it has important limitations. First, our design focused on people's predictions about unknown others based on a single prior behavior or mental state. However, people more typically interact with and make predictions about agents they know. Social prediction error may occur more strongly or weakly depending on one's relationship to the agent who is the object of prediction. For example, people believe that there are stronger obligations to help family members compared to non-family members (Marshall et al., 2021; McManus, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020; McManus, Mason, & Young, 2021), leading to neglect of family members being judged as more unexpected (see SOM of McManus, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020). Additionally, people seem to experience stronger prediction error when they imagine witnessing close (versus distant) others commit crimes (Berg, Kitiyama, & Kross, 2021), which may be due to their having stronger positive priors about close others (see Hughes, Ambady, & Zaki, 2017; Hughes, Zaki, & Ambady, 2017; Kim, Park, & Young, 2020). Future research can shed more light on the neural mechanisms involved in using relationship information to make and monitor predictions about an agent's mental states and behavior.

Second, the current experiment did not systematically vary the social context in which expectations were confirmed or violated, which may alter if and how social prediction error occurs. For example, imagine that an agent thinks to herself, "I want to speak up the next time I

hear a sexist joke about women.” However, the next time she hears a sexist joke is at her workplace where all of her colleagues are men. When she fails to speak up, you may be unsurprised, perhaps because you understand that she might experience additional negativity at her workplace in the future. Conversely, if at least half of her colleagues were women, you may be extremely surprised when she fails to speak up, perhaps because you believe she would have wanted to alleviate the possible discomfort experienced by her same-gendered colleagues. Such an example suggests that there are many potential features of the social context that can affect predictions and therefore what is considered unexpected, such as an agent’s reputational concerns, the demographic composition of surrounding others, and more.

Additionally, this example demonstrates that the time point at which a prediction is made, and whether this prediction is updated, is a crucial factor. If you were to predict the woman’s behavior at the exact time a sexist joke occurred, you might make starkly different predictions based on her social context. If, however, you predicted the woman’s behavior at an earlier time (e.g., the time at which you first learned she imagined speaking up), you may or may not update your prediction based on the context in which the sexist joke occurs. While recent work has documented that people update their (moral) impressions of others through learning more about the agents’ past behaviors (see Brambilla et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2020; Mann & Ferguson, 2017), less is known about how people update their predictions of an agent’s single future behavior over time. Future research could investigate the conditions under which predictions are updated and how this relates to prediction error (see Bach & Schenke, 2017 for a detailed discussion).

Third, although we failed to detect interaction effects based on the sources of information used to make and violate predictions, it is unlikely that such effects would never occur. For

example, imagine learning that someone thought to himself, “I really hate my coworkers and my role in this company. I want to quit.” When he continues to go into work, you may not be very surprised because you realize that people often think and want to do things that they do not do. However, if he instead sent out a company-wide e-mail stating, “I really hate my coworkers and my role in this company. I’m going to quit,” you might be extremely surprised when he continues to go into work. The critical difference between these cases is that the agent’s prior behavior seems to leave no doubt about his near-future intentions. We may not have seen such effects in the current data because most of the agents’ prior behaviors did not yield near-certain predictions. Interestingly, follow-up behavioral and behavior-brain analyses of our data suggest that vignette-level prediction confidence indeed varied substantially and was related to vignette-level neural activity during expectation confirmation/violation (see SOM). Unfortunately, we did not have enough condition-specific data to address whether prior information moderated these relations.

Relatedly, it is possible that our experimental paradigm was responsible for the observed null interactions. That is, after participants saw the first few stimuli, they would have become aware that they would have to continually make predictions about future behavior or future mental states based on both prior behavior and prior mental states. Once this awareness set in, it is possible (even likely) that participants were generating future behavior and future mental state predictions for each stimulus. This could have led to non-interactions between prior and future information on unexpectedness-related neural activity. Therefore, although our experimental paradigm was designed to address potential alternative explanations for prior research (i.e., Dungan et al. 2016), it may have fundamentally altered the psychological experience that we intended to study. Moreover, as noted elsewhere, even if our experimental paradigm was

unproblematic, null interactions could have been a function of low statistical power.

Consequently, future research is needed to better understand when prior behavior (or mental state) information leads to stronger predictions and its consequences on prediction error.

Last, there have been continued calls to communicate “constraints on generalizability” in psychology and neuroscience research (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017; Yarkoni, 2020). In addition to the above limitations, it is unclear if our recruited fMRI participants are representative of most people. Recent work suggests that fMRI research suffers from generalizability issues. Specifically, fMRI samples tend to be lower in trait anxiety than behavioral samples (Charpentier et al., 2021), suggesting a self-selection bias. Since past research has linked anxiety to ToM abilities (Washburn et al., 2016) and difficulty in understanding/completing ToM tasks (Lenton-Brym et al., 2018), future research on social prediction error would benefit from considering the role of anxiety and other individual differences.

### **Conclusion**

The current research found that brain regions implicated in theory of mind (ToM: DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ) are especially responsive to an agent’s unexpected behavior or mental states based on knowledge of their prior behavior or mental states. These findings also suggest that ToM regions may not discriminate in their sensitivity to expectedness based on information type, though additional research is needed to conclusively provide evidence for or against this possibility. Overall, these findings replicate recent research consistent with a predictive coding account of the neural computations underlying ToM (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013), and lay the foundation for future research investigating when, how, and for whom certain

kinds of prior social knowledge give rise to robust predictions and therefore shape prediction error signals.

## **Acknowledgments**

This section will be updated if the manuscript makes it successfully through peer review.

## **Author Contributions**

This section will be updated if the manuscript makes it successfully through peer review.

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