

Supporting Information

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SI Materials and Methods

Study 1: Analyses Including Political Ideology. Including political ideology as a covariate in the 2 (target: own-party vs. other-party) \times 2 (motive: love vs. hate) mixed-effects ANOVA did not alter the significance of the results. In addition, a 2 (political party: Democratic vs. Republican) \times 2 (target: own-party vs. other-party) \times 2 (motive: love vs. hate) mixed-effects ANOVA revealed the same significant target \times motive interaction but no main effect ($P = 0.16$) or interaction effect for political party ($P > 0.84$). Thus, the primary pattern was not affected by political affiliation.

Study 2: Analyses on Forced-Choice Items. Binomial tests on each item demonstrated that a majority of respondents (72%) indicated that Israeli support for conflict was driven by love ($z = 9.06, P < 0.0001$), and a majority of respondents (90%) suggested Palestinian support for conflict was driven by hate ($z = 16.47, P < 0.0001$).

Study 3: Analyses on Forced-Choice Items. Binomial tests on each item demonstrated that a majority of respondents (58%) indicated that Palestinian support for conflict was driven by love ($z = 5.72, P < 0.0001$), and a majority of respondents (83%) suggested Israeli support for conflict was driven by hate ($z = 23.12, P < 0.0001$).

Study 3: Data Collection. For this study, interviews were run by the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research (PSR), which translated all materials and focus-tested them for transparency of meaning. The sampling process went through three stages: (i) randomly selecting population locations (clusters or counting areas) using probability proportionate to size, (ii) randomly selecting households from the population locations using updated maps, and (iii) selecting a person who is 18 y or older from among persons in the house using the Kish tables method. The sample is self-weighting, but the PSR also checked to verify that the age groups we obtain are similar to those age groups in the society using data from official Palestinian and Israeli government statistics. Reweighting is done if necessary. To maximize the chances to enter all homes in the sample, two fieldworkers, a male and a female, conduct every interview so as to overcome social difficulties that may prevent a male/female from entering a home that does not have males/females at the time of the interview.

Study 4: Separate Analyses for Love Attributions and Hate Attributions. Separately analyzing the relationship between these consequence measures and the single-scale items for attribution of love to Palestinians and attribution of hate to Palestinians, respectively, also yielded significant results. Attribution of love to Palestinians was associated with decreased willingness to negotiate [$r(418) = -0.11, P = 0.022$], marginally reduced perceptions of a win-win [$r(382) = -0.09, P = 0.075$], and increased essentialist beliefs toward Palestinians [$r(434) = 0.13, P = 0.005$] and Israelis [$r(434) = 0.14, P = 0.004$], and was not significantly associated with other measures ($P > 0.14$). Attribution of hate to Palestinians was associated with decreased willingness to negotiate [$r(447) = -0.32, P < 0.0001$], reduced perceptions of a win-win [$r(405) = -0.33, P < 0.0001$], reduced optimism [$r(458) = -0.17, P < 0.0005$], reduced personal willingness to vote for a peace deal [$r(465) = -0.20, P < 0.0001$], reduced expectation that Palestinians will vote for a peace deal [$r(465) = -0.13, P = 0.006$], reduced expectation that Israelis will vote for a peace deal [$r(465) = -0.11, P = 0.017$], reduced positive compromise outcome beliefs [$r(465) = -0.37, P < 0.0001$], and increased essentialist beliefs toward Palestinians [$r(465) = 0.43, P < 0.0001$] and Israelis [$r(465) = 0.19, P < 0.0001$].

Interestingly, both attributions of love and hate increased essentialist beliefs, decreased willingness to negotiate, and reduced expectations for a win-win, suggesting that both attributions contribute independently to conflict. As we note below, however, the independent effects of these attributions differ in the Republican-Democratic conflict examined in study 5.

Study 4: Analyses on Forced-Choice Items. A binomial test demonstrated a majority of respondents (91%) suggested Palestinian support for conflict was driven by hate ($z = 17.04, P < 0.0001$). Forced-choice attribution of hate vs. love was associated with decreased willingness to negotiate [$r(417) = -0.25, P < 0.0001$], reduced perceptions of a win-win [$r(376) = -0.17, P = 0.001$], reduced optimism [$r(427) = -0.09, P = 0.069$], reduced personal willingness to vote for a peace deal [$r(434) = -0.16, P = 0.001$], reduced positive compromise outcome beliefs [$r(434) = -0.23, P < 0.0001$], and increased essentialist beliefs toward Palestinians [$r(434) = 0.26, P < 0.0001$] and Israelis [$r(465) = 0.11, P = 0.025$], and was not significantly associated with other measures ($P > 0.10$).

Study 4: Description of Instructional Condition and Analysis by Condition. In study 4, participants were randomly assigned to receive different instructions in a perspective-taking, empathy, or control condition. We manipulated instructions for perspective taking and empathy because research has shown that these processes can modify intergroup bias, and are capable of either reducing bias (1–3) or exacerbating bias (4–6), depending on context.

In the perspective-taking condition, modeled after typical perspective-taking manipulations (3), participants were told, “Now, we would like you to think about a typical Palestinian. Think about that person’s life in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Try to imagine how the person thinks about what has happened and how it has affected his or her life.” In the empathy condition, participants were told, “Now, we would like you to think about a typical Palestinian. Think about that person’s life in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Try to imagine how that person cares for his or her family and feels pain at the death of a loved one.” We included this last sentence as a means to reduce dehumanization, drawing from work that operationalized dehumanization that others experience “care and compassion for the family” and “pain at the death of a loved one” (7). In the control condition, participants were told, “Now, we would like you to think about a typical Palestinian. Think about that person’s life in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

We first tested whether our experimental inductions modulate the outgroup attribution bias. A 3 (condition: perspective-taking vs. empathy vs. control) \times 2 (motive: love vs. hate) mixed ANOVA that produced only a main effect of motive [$F(1, 428) = 161.03, P < 0.0001, \eta^2_P = 0.27$] and no interaction or main effect for condition ($P > 0.59$) was used. Replicating studies 1–3, participants judged their outgroup (Palestinians) to be driven by hate ($M = 3.29, SD = 0.95$) more than love ($M = 2.52, SD = 1.14$). Interestingly, condition also did not significantly alter responses to the forced-choice item regarding love vs. hate ($P = 0.38$), because a clear majority (91%) perceived hate to be a stronger motive than love across conditions ($z = 17.04, P < 0.0001$).

We also tested the influence of condition on all other measures, and the only significant result that emerged was for expected Israeli voting for a peace deal [$F(2, 495) = 3.97, P = 0.019, \eta^2_P = 0.02$], whereby planned contrasts revealed empathy ($M = 2.64, SD = 0.88$) and perspective-taking ($M = 2.57, SD = 0.90$) boosted expected support for a deal compared with the control

condition ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 0.89$) [$t(495) = 2.71$, $P = 0.007$, $d = 0.24$ and $t(495) = 2.03$, $P = 0.043$, $d = 0.18$, respectively].

Study 5: Experimental Manipulation. All participants received the following instructions, with the incentives condition participants receiving the additional instructions in italics:

Think about the political party that you belong to and think about members of the opposing political party. When the opposing party engages in conflict with your party, how much is THE OPPOSING PARTY motivated by each of the following? We will compare your responses with what people in the opposing party indicated as their motives, and the participant who is most accurate in indicating the correct responses of the OPPOSING PARTY will be given a \$12 bonus through MTurk [Amazon Mechanical Turk] (you will enter your MTurk ID at the end of the study). Again, how much is the OPPOSING PARTY motivated by each of the following.

Study 5: Separate Analyses for Love Attributions and Hate Attributions. As in study 3, we also examined the independent effects of attributions of love and hate to the ingroup and outgroup on our consequence measures. Attributions of hate to the ingroup and attributions of hate to the outgroup were associated with reduced optimism [$r(329) = -0.17$, $P = 0.003$ and $r(329) = -0.30$, $P < 0.0001$, respectively], whereas attributions of love to the outgroup were associated with increased optimism, [$r(329) = 0.16$, $P = 0.003$]. Attributions of hate to the ingroup and attributions of hate to the outgroup were associated with reduced perceptions of a win-win [$r(329) = -0.13$, $P = 0.021$ and $r(329) = -0.19$, $P = 0.001$, respectively]. Attributions of love to the ingroup and attributions of hate to the outgroup were associated with increased essentialism [$r(328) = 0.11$, $P = 0.043$ and $r(328) = 0.27$, $P < 0.0001$, respectively], and attributions of hate to the ingroup were marginally associated with increased essentialism [$r(328) = 0.09$, $P = 0.093$]. No other correlations were significant ($P > 0.17$). As in study 4, these findings provide evidence of independent contributions for love and hate attributions. In addition, they suggest that the effect of love attributions to the outgroup might be more variable, given

their positive association with optimism here despite no significant relationship in study 4.

Study 5: Analyses Including Political Ideology. To assess whether political affiliation affected our primary results, we included political ideology as a covariate in the 2 (condition: control vs. accuracy) \times 2 (target: own party vs. other party) \times 2 (motive: love vs. hate) mixed ANOVA, which did not alter the significance of the results. We also separately conducted a 2 (political affiliation: Democratic vs. Republican) \times 2 (condition: control vs. accuracy) \times 2 (target: own-party vs. other-party) \times 2 (motive: love vs. hate) mixed ANOVA. Of greatest importance, a condition \times target \times motive interaction emerged [$F(1, 327) = 22.40$, $P < 0.0001$, $\eta^2_P = 0.06$] and was not qualified by political affiliation ($P = 0.67$). This finding suggests that the effect of condition on attributions of love vs. hate across one's own party and the opposing party did not differ by political affiliation. Political affiliation interacted only with target and motive to produce a significant affiliation \times target \times motive interaction [$F(1, 327) = 10.23$, $P = 0.002$, $\eta^2_P = 0.03$]. Interestingly, unlike study 1, Republicans differed from Democrats in attributions of love and hate to their own party ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 1.39$ vs. $M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.63$; $P = 0.36$), a pattern reflective more of Palestinians in study 3, who indicated their own love and hate to a more equivalent degree. We hesitate to speculate too much on this finding, however, because (i) Republicans in this study do not express significantly more hate than love and (ii) combining these scores with the Republicans' attribution of love to the ingroup and attribution of hate to the ingroup scores in study 1, overall, Republicans report more love than hate ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.39$ vs. $M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.56$). Most important, and central to our predictions, Republicans and Democrats both perceive significantly more hate than love in the other party and are affected similarly by our manipulation of accuracy. In addition, political party did not interact with condition in its effect on any of the consequence measures ($P > 0.14$), suggesting that incentives for accuracy similarly affected downstream consequences of this attributional asymmetry for members of both political parties.

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




Fig. S1. Attributions of Democrats and Republicans to their own party and the opposing party in study 1. Error bars represent SEs.



Note 1: Incentives condition is coded as 1; control condition is coded as 0.
* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$



Note 1: Incentives condition is coded as 1; control condition is coded as 0.
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Fig. S2. Mediation analyses in study 5.