Academic Articles

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In Press

Syropoulos, S., Law, K.F., Kraft-Todd, G., Mah, A., Markowitz, E., & Young, L. (in press). Responsibility to future generations: A strategy for combatting climate change across political divides. British Journal of Social Psychology.

Loustau, T., Dungan, J., & Young, L. (in press). Moral values and social emotions in people with autism. Social Cognition.

McManus, R. M., Padilla Fong, H., Kleiman-Weiner, M., & Young, L. (2024). Most people do not “value the struggle”: Tempted agents are judged as less virtuous than those who were never tempted. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 113, 104615.


Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., & Young, L. (2024). Caring for present and future generations alike: Longtermism and moral regard across temporal and social distance. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 0(0).

Syropoulos, S.,* Law, K. F.,* & Young, L. (2024). The Case for Longtermism: Concern for the far future as a catalyst for pro-climate action. npj Climate Action, 3, 27.

Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., Mah, A., & Young, L. (2024). Intergenerational concern relates to constructive coping and emotional reactions to climate change via increased legacy concerns and environmental cognitive alternatives. BMC Psychology, 12, 182.

Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., & Young, L. (2024). Longtermist education interventions increase concern for and action to protect future generations. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 0(0).

Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., & Young, L. (2024). National differences in age and future-oriented indicators relate to environmental performance. Sustainability, 16(1), 276.


Law, K. F.,* Syropoulos, S.,& Young, L. Why do longtermists care about protecting the environment? An investigation into the underlying mechanisms of pro-climate policy support. Sustainability, 15(24), 16732.

Kumar, V., Kodipady, A., & Young, L. (2023). A psychological account of the unique decline in anti-gay attitudes. Philosophical Psychology, 1-35.

McManus, R. M., Young, L., & Sweetman, J. (2023). Psychology Is a Property of Persons, Not Averages or Distributions: Confronting the Group-to-Person Generalizability Problem in Experimental Psychology. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 6(3).

Kraft-Todd, G., Kleiman-Weiner, M., & Young, L. (2023). Virtue discounting: Observability reduces moral actors’ perceived virtue. Open Mind, 7, 460-482.

Handley-Miner, I. J., Pope, M., Atkins, R. K., Jones-Jang, S. M., McKaughan, D. J., Phillips, J., & Young, L. (2023). The intentions of information sources can affect what information people think qualifies as true. Scientific Reports, 13(1), 7718.

McManus, R., Dungan, J., Jiang, K., & Young, L. (2023). How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication. Social Neuroscience, 1–16.


Kim, M., Young, L., & Anzellotti, S. (2022). Exploring the representational structure of trait knowledge using perceived similarity. Social Cognition40(6), 549–579.

O’Connor, B. B., Lee, K., Campbell, D., & Young, L. (2022). Moral psychology from the lab to the wild: Relief registries as a paradigm for studying real-world altruism. PLOS One17(6), e0269469.

Lees, J., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2022). Morally questionable actors’ meta-perceptions are accurate but overly positive. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology102, 104371.

Krause, P., Gustafson, D., Theriault, J., & Young, L. (2022). Knowing is half the battle: How education decreases the fear of terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(7–8), 1147–1173.

Kraft-Todd, G., Kleiman-Weiner, M., & Young, L. (2022). Assessing and dissociating virtues from the ‘bottom up’: A case study of generosity vs. fairness. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1–12.

Martin, J. W., Leddy, K., Young, L., & McAuliffe, K. (2022). An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151(3), 597.

Karg, S. T., Kim, M., Mitkidis, P., & Young, L. (2022). Collaborative cheating in hierarchical teams: Effects of incentive structure and leader behavior on subordinate behavior and perceptions of leaders. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 01461672221090859.

Kodipady, A., Kraft-Todd, G., Sparkman, G., Hu, B., & Young, L. (2022). Beyond virtue signaling: Perceived motivations for pronoun sharing. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1–18.

Kim, M.J., Theriault, J., Hirschfeld-Kroen, J., & Young, L. (2022). Reframing of moral dilemmas reveals an unexpected “positivity bias” in updating and attributions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 101, 104310.

Park, B., Kim, M., & Young, L. (2022). The role of relational mobility in relationship quality and well-being. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 39(12), 3728–3752.

Dhaliwal, N., Martin, J. W., Barclay, P., & Young, L. (2022). Signaling benefits of partner choice decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151(6), 1446–1472.


McManus, R. M., Mason, J. E., & Young, L. (2021). Re-examining the role of family relationships in structuring perceived helping obligations, and their impact on moral evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 96, 104182.

Park, B., Kim, M., & Young, L. (2021). An examination of accurate versus “biased” mentalizing in moral and economic decision-making. In M. Gilead & K. N. Ochsner (Eds.), The neural basis of mentalizing (pp. 537–554). New York: Springer.

Handley-Miner, I., & Young, L. (2021). Do knowledge representations facilitate learning under epistemic uncertainty? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 44, E156.

Hirschfeld-Kroen, J., Jiang, K., Wasserman, E., Anzellotti, S., & Young, L. (2021). When my wrongs are worse than yours: Behavioral and neural asymmetries in first-person and third-person perspectives of accidental harms. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 94, 104102.

Tsoi, L., Hamlin, K., Waytz, A., Baron, A.S., & Young, L. (2021). A cooperation advantage for theory of mind in children and adults. Social Cognition, 39(1), 19–40.

Theriault, J., Young, L., & Feldman Barrett, L. (2021). The sense of should: a biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure. Physics of Life Reviews, 36, 100–136.

Niemi, L., Leone, C., & Young, L. (2021). Linguistic evidence for the dissociation between impurity and harm: Differences in the duration and scope of contamination versus injury. Social Cognition, 39(1), 117–138.

Kim, M., Mende-Siedlecki, P., Anzellotti, S., & Young, L. (2021). Theory of mind following the violation of strong and weak prior beliefs. Cerebral Cortex, 31(2), 884–898.


Greene, J. D., & Young, L. (2020). The cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment and decision-making. In D. Poeppel, G. R. Mangun, & M. S. Gazzaniga (Eds.),The cognitive neurosciences (6th ed., pp. 1005–1015). MIT Press.

Rottman, J., Zizik, V., Minard, K., Young, L., Blake, P. R., & Kelemen, D. (2020). The moral, or the story? Changing children’s distributive justice preferences through social communication. Cognition, 205, 104441.

Park, B., Fareri, D., Delgado, M., & Young, L. (2020). The role of right temporoparietal junction in processing social prediction error across relationship contexts. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 16(8), 772–781.

Theriault, J., Waytz, A., Heiphetz, L., & Young, L. (2020). Theory of Mind network activity is associated with metaethical judgment: An item analysis. Neuropsychologia143, 107475.

Niemi, L., Hartshorne, J., Gerstenberg, T., Stanley, M., & Young, L. (2020). Moral values reveal the causality implicit in verb meaning. Cognitive Science, 44(6), e12838.

Lees, J., & Young, L. (2020). A theory of wisdom needs theory of mind. Psychological Inquiry31(2), 168–173.

Kim, M., Park, B., & Young, L. (2020). The psychology of motivated versus rational impression updating. Trends in Cognitive Sciences24(2), 101–111.

Park, B., & Young, L. (2020). An association between biased impression updating and relationship facilitation: A behavioral and fMRI investigation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology87, 103916.

McManus, R. M., Kleiman-Weiner, M., & Young, L. (2020). What we owe to family: The impact of special obligations on moral judgment. Psychological Science31(3), 227–242.


Heiphetz, L., & Young, L. (2019). Children’s and adults’ affectionate generosity toward members of different religious groups. American Behavioral Scientist63(14), 1910–1937.

Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2019). Asking “Why?” enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience14(7), 699–708.

Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2019). Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle. Nature Communications10, 4389.

Anzellotti, S., & Young, L. (2019). The acquisition of person knowledge. Annual Review of Psychology71, 613–634.

Dungan, J., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2019). The power of moral concerns in predicting whistleblowing decisions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology85, 103848.

Niemi, L., Roussos, G., & Young, L. (2019). Political partisanship alters the causality implicit in verb meaning. Journal of Language and Social Psychology. 38(5–6), 809–819.

Rottman, J., & Young, L. (2019). Specks of dirt and tons of pain: Dosage distinguishes impurity from harm. Psychological Science30(8), 1151–1160.

Gaesser, B., Hirschfeld-Kroen, J., Wasserman, E., Horn, M., & Young, L. (2019). A role for the medial temporal lobe subsystem in guiding prosociality: The effect of episodic processes on willingness to help others. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience14(4), 397–410.

Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2019). Aversion to playing god and moral condemnation of technology and science. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences374(1771), 20180041.

Niemi, L., Woodring, M., Young, L., & Cordes, S. (2019). Partisan mathematical processing of political polling statistics: It’s the expectations that count. Cognition, 186, 95–107.


Theriault, J., & Young, L. (2018). Not as distinct as you think: Reasons to doubt that morality comprises a unified and objective conceptual category. Behavioral and Brain Sciences41, E114.

Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2018). Morality for us versus them. In K. Gray & J. Graham (Eds.), The atlas of moral psychology (pp. 186–192). Guilford Press.

Niemi, L., Wasserman, E. A., & Young, L. (2018). The behavioral and neural signatures of distinct conceptions of fairness. Social Neuroscience13(4), 399–415.

Piazza, J., Landy, J., Chakroff, A., Young, L., & Wasserman, E. A. (2018). What disgust does and does not do for moral cognition. In N. Strohminger & V. Kumar (Eds.), The moral psychology of disgust (pp. 53–81). Rowman & Littlefield International.

Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., Gelman, S., & Young, L. (2018). Who am I? The role of moral beliefs in children’s and adults’ understanding of identity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 78, 210–219.

Tsoi, L., Dungan, J., Chakroff, A., & Young, L. (2018). Neural substrates for moral judgments of psychological versus physical harm. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience13(5), 460–470.

Tsoi, L., & Young, L. (2018). Moral reasoning. In S. Thompson-Schill (Ed.), Language & thought. Volume 3 of the Stevens’ handbook of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience (4th ed., pp. 1–25). Editor-in-chief: J. Wixted. Wiley.

Gaesser, B., Keeler K., & Young, L. (2018). Moral imagination: Facilitating prosocial decision-making through scene imagery and theory of mind. Cognition, 171, 180–193.

Heiphetz, L., Lane, J., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2018). My mind, your mind, and God’s mind: How children and adults conceive of different agents’ moral beliefs. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 35(3), 467–481.


Chakroff, A., Russell, P. S., Piazza, J., & Young, L. (2017). From impure to harmful: Asymmetric expectations about immoral agents. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 201–209.

Graham, J., Waytz, A., Meindl, P., Iyer, R., & Young, L. (2017). Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the moral circle: Competing constraints on moral learning. Cognition167, 58–65.

Ford, J. H., Gaesser, B., DiBiase, H., Berro, T., Young, L., & Kensinger, E. (2017). Heroic memory: Remembering the details of others’ heroism in the aftermath of a traumatic public event can foster our own prosocial response. Applied Cognitive Psychology32(1), 47–54.

Theriault, J., Waytz, A., Heiphetz, L., & Young, L. (2017). Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General146(11), 1586–1605.

Niemi, L., & Young, L. (2017). Who sees what as fair? Mapping individual differences in valuation of reciprocity, charity, and impartiality. Social Justice Research30, 438–449.

Koster-Hale, J., Richardson, H., Vélez, N., Asaba, M., Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2017). Mentalizing regions represent distributed, continuous, and abstract dimensions of others’ beliefs. NeuroImage161, 9–18.

Wasserman, E. A., Chakroff, A., Saxe, R., & Young, L. (2017). Illuminating the conceptual structure of the space of moral violations with searchlight representational similarity analysis. NeuroImage159, 371–387.

Rottman, J., Young, L., & Kelemen, D. (2017). The impact of testimony on children’s moralization of novel actions. Emotion, 17(5), 811–827.

Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., & Young, L. (2017). The role of moral beliefs, memories, and preferences in representations of identity. Cognitive Science41, 744–767.

Heiphetz, L., & Young, L. (2017). Can only one person be right? The development of objectivism and social preferences regarding widely shared and controversial moral beliefs. Cognition167, 78–90.

Baez, S., Herrera, E., Garcia, A. M., Manes, F., Young, L., & Ibanez, A. (2017). Outcome-oriented moral evaluation in terrorists. Nature Human Behavior, 1, 1–8.

Heiphetz, L., Gelman, S. A., & Young, L. (2017). The perceived stability and biological basis of religious beliefs, factual beliefs, and opinions. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 156, 82–98.

Theriault, J., Krause, P., & Young, L. (2017). Know thy enemy: Education about terrorism improves social attitudes towards terrorists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(3), 305–317.

Patil, I., Calò, M., Fornasier, F., Young, L., & Silani, G. (2017). Neuroanatomical correlates of forgiving unintentional harms. Scientific Reports, 7, 45967.

Patil, I., Young, L., Sinay, V., & Gleichgerrcht, E. (2017). Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients. Social Neuroscience, 12(3), 308–329.

Dungan, J. A., Chakroff, A., & Young, L. (2017) The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions. PLOS One, 12(3), e0173405.


Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., & Graham, J. (2016). Ideological differences in the expanse of empathy. In P. Valdesolo & J. Graham (Eds.), Social psychology of political polarization (pp. 61–77). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Chakroff, A., Dungan, J., Koster-Hale, J. Brown, A., Saxe, R., & Young, L. (2016). When minds matter for moral judgment: Intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(3), 476–484.

Niemi, L., & Young, L. (2016). When and why we see victims as responsible: The impact of ideology on attitudes toward victims. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(9), 1227–1242.

Dungan, J., Stepanovic, M., & Young, L. (2016). Theory of mind for unexpected events across contexts. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(8), 1183–1192.

Tasimi, A., & Young, L. (2016). Memories of good deeds past: The reinforcing power of prosocial behavior in children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 147, 159–166.

Tsoi, L., Dungan, J., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2016). Distinct neural patterns of social cognition for cooperation versus competition. Neuroimage, 137, 86–96.

Niemi, L., & Young, L. (2016). Justice and the moral lexicon. Psychological Inquiry, 27(1), 50–54.


Gaesser, B., Horn, M., & Young, L. (2015). When can imagining the self increase willingness to help others? Investigating whether the self-referential nature of episodic simulation fosters prosociality. Social Cognition33(6), 562–584.

Chakroff, A., Thomas, K. A., Haque, O. S., & Young, L. (2014). An indecent proposal: The dual functions of indirect speech. Cognitive Science39(1), 199–211.

Chakroff, A., & Young, L. (2015). Harmful situations, impure people: An attribution asymmetry across moral domains. Cognition136, 30–37.

Dungan, J., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2015). The psychology of whistleblowing. Current Opinion in Psychology6, 129–133.

Heiphetz, L., Spelke, E. S., & Young, L. L. (2015). In the name of God: How children and adults judge agents who act for religious versus secular reasons. Cognition144, 134–149.

Heiphetz, L., Lane, D. J., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2015). How children and adults represent God’s mind. Cognitive Science, 40(1), 121–144.

Rottman, J., & Young, L. (2015). Mechanisms of moral development. In J. Decety & T. Wheatley (Eds.), The moral brain: A multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 123–142). MIT Press.

Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2015). Understanding the adaptive functions of morality from a cognitive psychological perspective. In R. A. Scott & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource (pp. 1–15). John Wiley & Sons (Wiley Online Library).

Chakroff, A., & Young, L. (2015). How the mind matters for morality. AJOB Neuroscience6(3), 41–46.

Rottman, J., Kelemen, D., & Young, L. (2015). Hindering harm and preserving purity: How can moral psychology save the planet? Philosophy Compass10(2), 134–144.


Theriault, J., & Young, L. (2014). Taking an “intentional stance” on moral psychology. In J. Sytsma (Ed.), Advances in experimental philosophy of mind (pp. 101–124). Continuum Press.

Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2014). When we see mind behind enemy lines: Two motivations for two dimensions of mind. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology55(2014), 278–283.

Waytz, A., Young, L., & Ginges, J. (2014). A motive attribution asymmetry for love versus hate drives intractable conflict. PNAS111(44), 15687–15692.

Chakroff, A., & Young, L. (2014). The prosocial brain: Perceiving others in need, and acting on it. In L. Padilla-Walker & G. Carlo (Eds.), Prosocial development: A multidimensional approach (pp. 90–111). Oxford University Press.

Dungan, J., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2014). Corruption in the context of moral tradeoffs. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics26(1–2), 97–118.

Rottman, J., Kelemen, D., & Young, L. (2014). Purity matters more than harm in moral judgments of suicide: Response to Gray (2014). Cognition, 133(1), 332–334.

Rottman, J., & Young, L. (2014). Comment: Scholarly disgust and related mysteries. Emotion Review6(3), 222–223.

Niemi, L., & Young L. (2014). Blaming the victim in the case of rape. Psychological Inquiry25(2), 230–233.

Rottman, J., Kelemen, D., & Young, L. (2014). Tainting the soul: Purity concerns predict moral judgments of suicide. Cognition130(2), 217–226.

Heiphetz, L., & Young, L. (2014). A social cognitive developmental perspective on moral judgment. Behaviour151(2–3), 315–335.

Carmona-Perera, M., Clark, L., Young, L., Perez-Garcia, M., & Verdejo-García, A. (2014). Impaired decoding of fear and disgust predicts utilitarian moral judgment in alcohol-dependent individuals. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research38(1), 179–185.


Niemi, L., & Young, L. (2013). Caring across boundaries versus keeping boundaries intact: Links between moral values and interpersonal orientations. PLOS One, 8(12), e81605.

Dufour, N., Redcay, E., Young, L., Mavros, P. L., Moran, J. M., Triantafyllou, C., Gabrieli, J. D. E., & Saxe, R. (2013). Similar brain activation during false belief tasks in a large sample of adults with and without autism. PLOS One8(9), e75468.

Waytz, A., Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2013). The whistleblower’s dilemma and the fairness-loyalty tradeoff. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(6), 1027–1033.

Chakroff, A., Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2013). Harming ourselves and defiling others: What determines a moral domain? PLOS One8(9), e74434.

Koster-Hale, J., Saxe, R., Dungan, J., & Young, L. L. (2013). Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions. PNAS110(14), 5648–5653.

Hawley-Dolan, A., & Young L. (2013). Whose mind matters more—the agent or the artist? An investigation of ethical and aesthetic evaluations. PLOS One, 8(9), e70759.

Gleichgerrcht, E., & Young, L. (2013). Low levels of empathic concern predict utilitarian moral judgment. PLOS One8(4), e60418.

Young, L., & Durwin, A. (2013). Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology49(2), 302–306.

Young, L., & Tsoi, L. (2013). When mental states matter, when they don’t, and what that means for morality. Social and Personality Psychology Compass7(8), 585–604.

Young, L.*, & Waytz, A.* (2013). Mind attribution is for morality. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & M. Lombardo (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental social neuroscience (pp. 93–103). Oxford University Press.

Young, L. (2013). Moral thinking. In D. Reisberg (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology (pp. 753–766). Oxford University Press.

Saxe, R., & Young, L. (2013). Theory of Mind: How brains think about thoughts. In K. N. Ochsner & S. Kosslyn (Eds.), The handbook of cognitive neuroscience (pp. 204–213). Oxford University Press.


Young, L., Chakroff, A., & Tom, J. (2012). Doing good leads to more good: The reinforcing power of a moral self-concept. Review of Philosophy and Psychology3(3), 325–334.

Young, L.*, Koenigs, M.*, Kruepke, M., & Newman, J. (2012). Psychopathy increases perceived moral permissibility of accidents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology21(3), 659–667.

Waytz, L., & Young, L. (2012). The group-member mind tradeoff: Attributing mind to groups versus group members. Psychological Science23(1), 77–85.

Carmona-Perera, M., Verdejo-García, A., Young, L., Molina-Fernández, A., & Pérez-García, M. (2012). Moral decision-making in polysubstance dependent individuals, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 126(3), 389–392.

Young, L., & Dungan, J. (2012). Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere. Social Neuroscience7(1), 1–10.

Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. Psychological Inquiry23(2), 101–124.

Gray, K., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2012). The moral dyad: A fundamental template unifying moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry23(2), 206–215.

Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2012). The two-type model of morality. In D. Fassin (Ed.), Companion to moral anthropology (pp. 578–594). Wiley-Blackwell.


Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2011). When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains. Cognition120(2), 202–214.

Young, L., & Phillips, J. (2011). The paradox of moral focus. Cognition119(2), 166–178.

Moran, J.*, Young, L.*, Saxe, R., Lee, S., O’Young, D., Mavros, P., & Gabrieli, J. (2011). Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high functioning autism. PNAS108(7), 2688–2692.

Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. Cognitive Science35(6), 1052–1075.

Young, L., Scholz, J., & Saxe, R. (2011). Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. Social Neuroscience6(3), 302–315.

Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2011). Moral universals and individual differences. Emotion Review3(3), 323–324.

Hawley-Dolan, A., & Young, L. (2011). Whose mind matters more: The moral agent or the artist? The role of intent in ethics and aesthetics. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Gweon, H., Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2011). Theory of Mind for you, and for me: Behavioral and neural similarities and differences in thinking about beliefs of the self and other. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Phillips, J., & Young, L. (2011). Apparent Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning; or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn’t forced to do it. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2011). Multiple moralities: Tensions and tradeoffs in moral psychology and the law. Thurgood Marshall Law Review36, 177–195.


Young, L., Camprodon, J., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., & Saxe, R. (2010). Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments. PNAS107(15), 6753–6758.

Young, L., Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2010). Damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex impairs judgment of harmful intent. Neuron65(6), 845–851.

Young, L. Feder, D., & Saxe, R. (2010). What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind. Neuropsychologia48(9), 2658–2664.

Young, L., Nichols, S., & Saxe, R. (2010). Investigating the neural and cognitive basis of moral luck: It’s not what you do but what you know. Review of Philosophy and Psychology1, 333–349.

Miller, M., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., King, D., Paggi, A., Fabri, M., Polonara, G., & Gazzaniga, M. (2010). Abnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy patients. Neuropsychologia48(7), 2215–2220.

Young, L., & Saxe R. (2010). It’s not just what you do, but what’s on your mind: A review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in ethics.” Neuroethics, 3, 201–207.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., & Cushman, F. (2010). Moral intuitions as heuristics. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & S. Stich (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 246–272). Oxford University Press.

Cushman, F., Young, L., & Greene, J. (2010). Our multi-system moral psychology: Towards a consensus view. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & S. Stich (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 47–71). Oxford University Press.


Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009). Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity. Neuropsychologia47(10), 2065–2072.

Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009). An fMRI Investigation of spontaneous mental state inference for moral judgment. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience21(7), 1396–1405.

Glenn, A. L., Raine, A., Schug, R. A, Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2009). Increased DLPFC activity during moral decision-making in psychopathy. Molecular Psychiatry14(10), 908–911.

Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2009) The psychology of dilemmas and the philosophy of morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice12(1), 9–24.


Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2008). The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment. NeuroImage, 40(4), 1912–1920.

Kliemann, D., Young, L., Scholz, J., & Saxe, R. (2008). The influence of prior record on moral judgment. Neuropsychologia, 46(12), 2949–2957.

Hauser, M., Young L., & Cushman, F. (2008). On misreading the linguistic analogy: Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 171–180). Oxford University Press.

Hauser, M., Young, L., & Cushman, F. (2008). Reviving Rawls’ linguistic analogy: Operative principles and the structure of moral actions. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 107–144). Oxford University Press.

Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2008). Replying to G. Kahane & N. Shackel. Nature452, E5–E6.


Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. PNAS,104(20), 8235–8240.

Young, L., & Koenigs, M. (2007). Investigating emotion in moral cognition: a review of evidence from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychology. British Medical Bulletin84(1), 67–79.

Koenigs, M.*, Young, L.*, Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature446(7138), 908–911.

Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Jin, R., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language22(1), 1–21.


Young, L., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Adolphs, R. (2006). Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture6(1–2), 265–278.

Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science17(12), 1082–1089.

Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The psychology of justice: A commentary on natural justice by Ken Binmore. Analyse & Kritik28(1), 95–98.