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Please find below: (1) Academic Articles, and (2) Essays for Popular Audiences


Academic Articles

In Press

    Young, L., Tsoi, L. (in press). When mental states matter, when they don’t, and what that means for morality. Social and Personality Psychology Compass. [pdf]

    Chakroff, A., Young, L. (in press). The prosocial brain: perceiving others in need, and acting on it. In L. Padilla-Walker, G. Carlo (eds.), The Complexities of Raising Prosocial Children: An Examination of the Multidimensionality of Prosocial Behaviors. Oxford University Press.

    Theriault, J., Young, L. (in press). Dimensions of mind perception and the intentional stance. In J. Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum.

    Young, L.*, Waytz, A.* (in press). Morality. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, M. Lombardo (eds.), Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press. *Equal contributors [pdf]

    Saxe, R., Young, L. (in press). Theory of Mind: How brains think about thoughts. In K. Ochsner & S. Kosslyn (eds.), The Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

2013

    Gleichgerrcht, E., Young, L. (2013). Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict Utilitarian Moral Judgment. PLOS ONE, 8(4), e60418. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060418 [pdf]

    Koster-Hale, J., Saxe, R., Dungan, J., Young, L. L. (2013). Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions. PNAS, 110(14), 5648–5653. doi:10.1073/pnas.1207992110 [pdf]

    Young, L., Durwin, A. (2013). Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(2013), 302-306. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.11.013 [pdf]

    Young, L. (2013). Moral Thinking. In D. Reisberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

2012

    Young, L., Chakroff, A., Tom, J. (2012). Doing good leads to more good: The reinforcing power of a moral self-concept. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 325-334. doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0111-6 [pdf]

    Young, L.*, Koenigs, M.*, Kruepke, M., Newman, J. (2012). Psychopathy increases perceived moral permissibility of accidents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. doi:10.1037/a0027489 *Equal contributors [pdf]

    Waytz, L., Young, L. (2012). The Group-Member Mind Tradeoff: Attributing Mind to Groups versus Group Members. Psychological Science, 23, 77-85. doi:10.1177/0956797611423546 [pdf]

    Carmona-Perera, M., Verdejo-García, A., Young, L., Molina-Fernández, A., & Pérez-García, M. (2012). Moral decision-making in polysubstance dependent individuals, Drug and Alcohol Dependence. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2012.05.038 [pdf]

    Young, L., Dungan, J. (2012). Where in the Brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere. Social Neuroscience, 7, 1-10. doi:10.1080/17470919.2011.569146 [pdf]

    Gray, K., Young, L., Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101-124. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2012.651387 [pdf]

    Gray, K., Waytz, A., Young, L. (2012). The Moral Dyad: A fundamental template unifying moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 206-215. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2012.686247 [pdf]

    Dungan, J., Young, L. (2012). The two-type model of morality. In D. Fassin (ed.), Companion to Moral Anthropology. Wiley-Blackwell. [pdf]

2011

    Young, L., Saxe, R. (2011). When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains. Cognition, 120, 202-214. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005 [pdf]

    Young, L.*, Phillips, J.* (2011). The Paradox of Moral Focus. Cognition, 119, 166-178. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.004 *Equal contributors [pdf]

    Moran, J.*, Young, L.*, Saxe, R., Lee, S., O’Young, D., Mavros, P., Gabrieli, J. (2011). Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high functioning autism. PNAS, 108, 2688-2692. doi:10.1073/pnas.1011734108 *Equal contributors [pdf]

    Cushman, F., Young, L. (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive from Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science, 35, 1052-1075. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x [pdf]

    Young, L., Scholz, J., Saxe, R. (2011). Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. Social Neuroscience, 6, 302-315. doi:10.1080/17470919.2010.529712 [pdf]

    Young, L., Saxe, R. (2011). Moral Universals and Individual Differences. Emotion Review, 3, 323-324. doi:10.1177/1754073911402383 [pdf]

    Hawley-Dolan, A., Young, L. (2011). Whose Mind Matters More: The moral agent or the artist? The role of intent in ethics and aesthetics. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. [pdf]

    Gweon, H., Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2011). Theory of Mind for you, and for me: behavioral and neural similarities and differences in thinking about beliefs of the self and other. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. [pdf]

    Phillips, J., Young, L., (2011). Apparent Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning; Or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn’t forced to do it. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. [pdf]

    Dungan, J., Young, L. (2011). Multiple Moralities: Tensions and tradeoffs in moral psychology and the law. Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 36, 177-195. [pdf]

2010

    Young, L., Camprodon, J., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., Saxe, R. (2010). Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments. PNAS, 107, 6753-6758. doi:10.1073/pnas.0914826107 [pdf]

    Young, L., Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (2010). Damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex impairs judgment of harmful intent. Neuron, 65, 845-851. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.003 [pdf]

    Young, L. Feder, D., Saxe, R. (2010). What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind. Neuropsychologia, 48, 2658-2664. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.012 [pdf]

    Young, L., Nichols, S., Saxe, R. (2010). Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What you Know. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 333-349. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0027-y [pdf]

    Miller, M., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., King, D., Paggi, A., Fabri, M., Polonara, G., Gazzaniga, M. (2010). Abnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy patients. Neuropsychologia, 48, 2215-2220. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.02.021 [pdf]

    Young, L., Saxe R. (2010). It’s not just what you do, but what’s on your mind. Neuroethics, 3, 201-207. doi:10.1007/s12152-010-9066-4 [pdf]

    Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., Cushman, F. (2010). Moral Intuitions as Heuristics. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

    Cushman, F., Young, L., Greene, J. (2010). Our multi-system moral psychology: Towards a consensus view. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

2009

    Young, L., Saxe, R. (2009). Innocent Intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity. Neuropsychologia, 47, 2065-2072. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020 [pdf]

    Young, L., Saxe, R. (2009). An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 1396-1405. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21137 [pdf]

    Glen, A., Raine, A., Schug, R., Young, L., Hauser, M. (2009). Do psychopathic patients use their DLPFC when making decisions in moral dilemmas? Molecular Psychiatry, 14, 908-911. doi:10.1038/mp.2009.71 [pdf]

    Cushman, F., Young, L. (2009) The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12(1), 9-24. doi:10.1007/s10677-008-9145-3 [pdf]

2008

    Young, L., Saxe, R. (2008). The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment. NeuroImage, 40, 1912-1920. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.057 [pdf]

    Kliemann, D., Young, L., Scholz, J., Saxe, R. (2008). The influence of prior record on moral judgment. Neuropsychologia, 46, 2949-2957. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.06.010 [pdf]

    Hauser, M., Young, L., Cushman, F. (2008). On Misreading the Linguistic Analogy: Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

    Hauser, M., Young, L., Cushman, F. (2008). Reviving Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

    Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (2008). Reply to G. Kahane & N. Shackel. Nature, 452, E5-E6. doi:10.1038/nature06785 [pdf]

2007

    Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. PNAS, 104(20), 8235-8240. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 [pdf]

    Young, L., Koenigs, M. (2007). Investigating emotion in moral cognition: a review of evidence from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychology. British Medical Bulletin, 84, 67-79. doi:10.1093/bmb/ldm031 [pdf]

    Koenigs, M.*, Young, L.*, Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908-911. doi:10.1038/nature05631 *Equal contributors [pdf]

    Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Jin, R., Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language, 22(1), 1-21. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x [pdf]

2006

    Young, L., Cushman, F., Adolphs, R., Tranel D., Hauser, M. (2006). Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1-2), 265-278. doi:10.1163/156853706776931312 [pdf]

    Cushman, F., Young, L., Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082-1089. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x [pdf]

    Cushman, F., Young, L., Hauser, M. (2006). The psychology of Justice: A commentary on Natural Justice by Ken Binmore. Analyse & Kritik, 28, 95-98. [pdf]


Essays For Popular Audiences